Information overload: CCTV, your networks, communities and crime by Harris, Vandra Marie Elizabeth & Harris, Crispin




Proceedings of the  
2nd Australian Security and Intelligence 
Conference 
 
1st to 3rd December 2009 
 
Kings Hotel, 
Perth, Western Australia 
 
Published By 
secau - Security Research Centre 
School of Computer and Security Science  
Edith Cowan University 
Perth, Western Australia 
 
Edited by 
David Michael Cook  
secau - Security Research Centre 
School of Computer and Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Perth, Western Australia  
Copyright 2009, All Rights Reserved 
ISBN 978-0-7298-0679-4   
 
CRICOS Institution Provider Code 00279B 
   
Harris, V.M. & Harris, C., 2009. Information Overload: CCTV, your networks, communities and crime. 
Proceedings of the 2nd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, 10-18. Copyright 2009, Authors. 
Available at http://igneous.scis.ecu.edu.au/proceedings/2009/secintel/Information%20overload%20CCTV%20your%20networks,%20communities%20and%20crime.pdf
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
Proceedings of the 2nd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference 
 
10 | P a g e  
 
 
Information overload: CCTV, your networks, communities and crime 
 
Vandra Harris1 & Crispin Harris2 
1 School of Law 
Flinders University 
 
2 Security Consultant 
Abstract 
Electronic surveillance continues to play a central but often unobserved role in contemporary Western societies and 
attempts to police them.  This paper focuses on closed circuit television (CCTV) footage and its technological 
implications, particularly relating infrastructure and data storage and integrity.  While CCTV might appear attractive 
in augmenting law enforcement systems, the authors argue that the debate on use of CCTV in crime prevention remains 
incomplete without an effective understanding of the diverse costs.  This discussion reveals startling ICT resource needs 
and associated costs, together with very specific technological capacity.  These contribute significantly to the costs of 
such systems, reinforcing the authors’ argument that CCTV is no golden bullet for law enforcement. 
Key words 
CCTV; data security; live streaming; law enforcement; policing 
INTRODUCTION 
Closed circuit television (CCTV) systems collect video and direct it to a central monitoring system that may be 
monitored in real time or ‘near real time’1, and/or record the video for later inspection or playback.  There are four key 
aims of these systems in law enforcement: deterrence, rapid response, investigation and identification, and prosecution 
of crime.  As technological developments in the last four decades have made CCTV cheaper, smaller and easier to 
operate, its use has expanded significantly, to the point that a European survey revealed that nearly one in three 
premises and institutions utilised CCTV surveillance in 2002 (Hempel and Töpfer, 2004, p. 3).  As use has increased, so 
too has commentary on the effectiveness of the medium, its impact on society, and the attempt to balance the rights and 
liberties of ‘the innocent’ with the responsibility to protect them and apprehend ‘the guilty’.  This paper aims to balance 
that commentary with a clear understanding of the technological impact and requirements of such systems, to assist 
effective planning and decision-making regarding CCTV use for law enforcement. 
A scan of Australian newspapers reveals that CCTV is popularly perceived as effective in deterring crime and securing 
convictions.  Prior to the 2007 APEC Summit in Sydney, the number of CCTV cameras monitoring that city’s public 
transport network was increased to 6,400, as a ‘strong deterrent to common criminals and thugs’ (NSW Acting Premier 
John Watkins, cited by AAP, 2007).  Similarly, a more recent article in The Australian (Martin, 2009) stated that the 
showing of CCTV footage on news broadcasts acts ‘as an overarching safeguard and deterrent’.  This perception is not 
necessarily matched by evidence, and needs to be balanced with a clear understanding of the actual efficacy as well as 
the technological requirements of systems.  Understanding this will contribute to the ongoing dialogue about the 
usefulness of this tool in an era of increased surveillance and shifting perceptions of a need to balance civil liberty and 
civic safety. 
Our specific contribution to this debate concerns the technological aspects of CCTV, in particular the impact on 
technology and data storage requirements for enforcement regimes, notably by police.  The paper commences with a 
brief explanation of the technologies we address, and the contexts in which their applications relate to law enforcement.  
We then briefly address the academic literature on the efficacy of CCTV in crime prevention and prosecution, before 
moving to our primary focus on the realities of data management arising from CCTV applications in mainstream law 
enforcement.  This discussion includes attention to the question of whether CCTV is a cost-effective method, and 
whether technological resources currently available to Australian police forces are adequate for optimal use of CCTV 
tools.  We note that significant investment would be necessary in the short term to ensure that police services can 
adequately manage the data arising from increasing CCTV application and to ensure that the technology meets the 
needs and expectations of these services.  We conclude that while CCTV can be useful in a number of ways, the 
expectations must be well defined, and infrastructure impact must be carefully considered as a core component of the 
implementation.  
                                                          
1 That is, within minutes of the actual events. 
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TERMS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
It is important to commence with a strong understanding of the terms and technologies in focus in this paper.  CCTV 
cameras record individual images that together create a moving image.  Most CCTV systems collect these images at a 
rate of over 15 per camera per second.  Individually, these images – or ‘video frames’ – are smaller than most 
commonly available images (less than 16Kb per frame)2.  While the individual images are small, the collection of this 
information for later playback can add up to a substantial amount of data: one camera recording low quality video for 
24 hours at this rate will record at least 1.3million images, generating over 20Gb of video (equivalent to 5 movie-length 
DVDs).  
 ‘Streaming’ of data refers to the practice of sending a constant flow of data (usually audio or video) over a data 
network to a remote location, and ‘live streaming’ refers to transmission of this data at the time that it is captured.  In 
practical application, live streaming of CCTV is the exception rather than the rule – video is usually recorded for later 
reference rather than being monitored immediately.  Banks, for example, store CCTV footage at branches rather than 
centrally, due to the volume of data created by 16-32 cameras per branch, generally recording higher quality (and thus 
larger) images than those described above.  Such a high volume of data would require significant bandwidth for 
transmission, but in this case identification after the fact has been deemed sufficient when combined with other security 
mechanisms. 
Live streaming is usually used for transient data (that is, data that will not normally be stored after viewing) and in most 
cases involves the transfer of high volumes of data.  Examples of cases in which live video streaming may be applied 
include internet broadcasts of sporting matches and the NASA ‘net-cast’ space shuttle launches3.  In crime prevention 
applications, CCTV footage is streamed to enable live monitoring of locations or events as they occur.  An example of a 
substantial, actively monitored CCTV system is a public railway network: metropolitan rail networks frequently have 
over 5,000 cameras and are actively monitored by railway police in a central location.  Where data is not streamed, it is 
stored on the site of collection.  
While CCTV system sizes vary, a regular ‘off-the-shelf’ system (which can be sold as a pre-packaged bundle or in 
separate pieces) generally comprises up to 16 cameras4.  Systems of this size would be appropriate for a small to 
medium business with a single physical location, and includes approximately a terabyte5 (Tb) of local storage (adequate 
for seven days of recorded data) and dvd burner to allow data to be recorded for review.  As will be discussed, both 
storage and transmission of this volume of information can involve substantial financial investment (including 
conversion equipment, storage space and systems that enable later retrieval of data).  Public space systems tend to be 
many times larger than this, as in the case of the rail network referred to above. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS  
Where CCTV is used for surveillance it is rarely a police operation: private enterprise or different levels of government 
frequently install and/or monitor cameras, either exclusively or in partnership with police.  According to Wilson and 
Sutton (2003, p. 2) ‘the push to establish CCTV in Australia has come from local government’, and this diversified 
ownership and responsibility has particular implications that will be expanded below.  Where CCTV is used in 
crime/incident investigation (to assist investigations into crimes that have already occurred), the video is generally 
sourced from non-law enforcement CCTV systems such as these.  It is therefore not useful to limit this discussion only 
to police-owned and operated CCTV systems. 
Nonetheless CCTV is used in a diverse range of law enforcement contexts, for one or more of the four purposes listed 
above (deterrence, response, investigation and prosecution).  Live-monitored CCTV may be used for control and 
management of major events, to ensure that public safety is maintained and to respond quickly to emerging 
disturbances.  An example of this is the large public New Year’s Eve celebrations in the South Australian beachside 
suburb of Glenelg, where live streamed CCTV monitoring has been used by police for some years.  A similar usage is 
in the active CCTV monitoring of high crime locations or of places such as prisons.  In both of these applications, 
CCTV may be used as a deterrent as well as facilitating rapid response to incidents.  Of course this is not always 
foolproof, as seen in the case of a recent violent melee at Sydney’s domestic airport in which one person died, when 
                                                          
2 A standard 15x10cm photographic print at full resolution requires about 67,500kb.  A small web picture or logo will 
commonly require 16-64kb, and while such an image would be clear at the size of 6x4cm, it would be heavily pixelated 
at 12x8cm. 
3 A football match would typically be distributed at 1megabit/second for ‘Slow’ connections or 5-12Megabits/second 
for ‘high-speed’ connections leading to a total of up to 9gb for a one hour broadcast. 
4 Both components and full systems can be purchased online through sites such as Amazon, eBay, or specialist suppliers 
for less than 1400AUD. 
5 A terabyte is 1,024 gigabytes, while a gigabyte is 1,024 megabytes.  Thus a terabyte is equivalent to the storage of 4 to 
8 current domestic laptops. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
Proceedings of the 2nd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
‘despite the banks of CCTV cameras, which are supposedly monitored, it took a member of the public to dial 000 and 
alert police’ (O’Brien and Creedy, 2009)6.  
CCTV use in response to crime may involve the deployment of officers in response to an action caught on camera, or 
provision of specific operational intelligence in real-time support of tactical operations (for example infrared and visible 
light cameras in a helicopter or unpiloted aerial vehicle).  Such operational support video can be used and monitored at 
the point of capture, however it is frequently sent in real-time (‘as it happens’) to a command and control facility to 
assist in directing resources.  Video captured by police cameras during an operation such as this would normally be 
retained after viewing as a part of operational record-keeping requirements. 
CCTV EFFECTIVENESS 
Our purpose here is to provide a brief overview of this literature, to provide a context to the technical discussion that is 
the core of our paper.  As Wilson and Sutton (2003 p. 1) note, ‘Although CCTV has expanded rapidly in public spaces 
it remains a controversial measure whose outcomes and appropriateness are hotly contested.’  We follow five key 
threads in discussing the literature on the law enforcement effectiveness of CCTV:  measuring impact; success in 
preventing crime; accuracy, particularly with regard to convictions; public support and belief in its effectiveness; and 
workload implications.  
Readers of the academic literature on CCTV effectiveness may be struck by the repetition of one particular word: 
inconclusive.  A key reason for this is that it is very difficult to measure impact due to factors such as absence or 
incompatibility of figures for prior periods, inability to measure whether crime has simply been pushed into other areas, 
and differing methodologies (see Gill et al., 2007; Gill and Sprigg, 2005; Wilson and Sutton, 2003).  Added to this is 
the challenge of measuring impact, since comparison of crime statistics is fraught by the reality that crime statistics may 
not be disaggregated to a useful degree, that many factors affect changes in measurements, and that monitoring periods 
may not be sufficient to draw firm conclusions (Short and Ditton, 1998, p.12; Wilson and Sutton, 2003, p. 2).  In this 
context, Welsh and Farrington (2004) conducted a thorough comparison of a large number of studies to compare the 
crime deterrent effect of installing CCTV in public spaces with that of increasing lighting.  They found that both actions 
‘represent effective situational measures for reducing crime’, particularly in the case of property crime (as opposed to 
violent crime).  They also found that in city centres, street lighting had a greater impact on crime than installing CCTV 
cameras (Welsh and Farrington, 2004, p. 513). 
With respect to deterrence, a long term study comparing application of and attitudes to CCTV in eight European 
countries found that  
the majority of CCTV systems aim to prevent deviant behaviour by symbolic but more or less 
incompetent deterrence because cameras are highly visible but those under surveillance are hardly visible 
for an observer due to irregular monitoring, informational overkill or even the deployment of dummy 
cameras. (Hempel and Töpfer 2004, p. 7) 
Reinforcing this perspective, Privacy International (2007) notes that the existence of CCTV surveillance in London did 
not deter the July 2005 terrorist attack, nor did it detect attempted attacks in 2007.  In contrast, Gill and Spriggs’ report 
to the UK Home Office noted that police and security staff found it useful to be ‘able to remind individuals that cameras 
were watching them as a way of increasing compliance’ (2005, p. 115) 
In relation to accuracy, Henderson, Bruce and Burton (2001) conducted a series of tests that revealed that even under 
optimal conditions, the accuracy of face matching techniques using CCTV, broadcast quality recording, and still 
photographic images was at best unreliable, not least due to the low quality images used.  The highest success rate 
(75%) for face matching was achieved when comparison was between different posed photographs, while comparing 
still photographs with CCTV footage of a person achieved a success rate of only 20%.  While it has been stated that 
CCTV footage is particularly useful when ‘you know who you are looking for’ (Coleman and Sim, 2000, p. 629, 
emphasis in original interview), Henderson et al. discovered that even when asked to state which of just two posed 
photographs showed the offender in a high quality CCTV, accuracy remained at just 65% (2001, p. 460). 
There is also some disagreement about the appropriateness of using CCTV for public surveillance.  Conflicting social 
attitudes to these technologies have been reported, both between countries and between social groups (see for example 
Singer 2009 and Hempel and Töpfer 2004, pp.8-9).  Levine (2000) has argued that people’s response to surveillance is 
significantly influenced by their social location (or ‘group membership’) – that is to say, how they locate themselves in 
relation to those advocating or performing the surveillance.  McCahill and Norris cite a range of papers that report 
negative effects on young people arising from CCTV usage, whether or not it is specifically targeted at them (2002, p. 
14). 
                                                          
6 Such tragic examples are not new, and the Hillsborough football disaster of 1989 stands as a stark example of actively 
police-monitored CCTV that did not facilitate a police response that saved lives (see McMillan 2009). 
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Coleman and Sim (2000, p. 635) note that CCTV has been touted as promoting human freedom, in the sense of 
allowing citizens to feel safe in public spaces, however there has also been protestation that CCTV infringes on people’s 
freedom and privacy.  Privacy International (2007) states that the international trend for governments to collect and 
retain an increasing amount of information about people within their borders implies that ‘all citizens, regardless of 
legal status, are under suspicion.’  Mann (1998, p. 94) challenges that the individual has a right to ‘self ownership’ that 
is compromised by CCTV, while Vitale (2006, p. 180) writes of a ‘creation of a new kind of sociospatial order and a 
new neoliberal urban subjectivity’ – and indeed other authors point to its disproportionate effects on those already 
marginalised (e.g. White and Sutton, 1995, pp.89-91; Coleman and Sim, 2000, p. 634). 
Perhaps the strongest outcomes around CCTV usage can be seen in public perceptions of personal safety, which a range 
of studies have found to be positive (see Wilson and Sutton, 2003, p. 5, Gill et al., 2007, p. 306).  Yet O’Donnell et al. 
point out that CCTV use ‘may be perceived either as promoting the safety of those in the area or as motivated by a lack 
of trust in the residents’ (2009, p.2).  In other words, if one feels that surveillance is being used to protect one’s person 
and property, and identifies with the group implementing the surveillance, then one is more likely to feel it is a positive 
technology.  Conversely, however, if one already feels marginalised and mistrusted – as may be the case for example 
with homeless people, or others who feel they are only liminal members of society – CCTV surveillance is likely to 
increase this sense/experience of marginalisation. 
Finally, in addition to significant physical costs7, live streaming of CCTV footage has significant human workload 
implications.  If footage is to be screened live rather than stored, then it must be monitored.  Monitoring by police 
necessarily removes officers from other tasks, at a time when there is continued political and community demand for 
visible policing ‘on the streets’, and when it is unlikely that policing budgets would be expanded to allow for extra staff 
to do this work – with the result that some police feel ‘imaged out’ (Gill and Sprigg, 2005, p. 115).  In many cases, 
CCTV footage is therefore monitored by private groups or individuals, in what Norris and McCahill (2006, p. 105) 
describe as a move towards ‘hybrid policing’ in which distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ become less clear. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this took place in Liverpool Council in the 1990s, when a group of business 
owners and the city council collaborated to have CCTV cameras installed in key areas of the city, with the intent of 
increasing perceived safety and thus consumer traffic.  While the local police had input into the location of cameras, it 
was members of the business partnership who undertook monitoring of the camera footage (Vitale, 2006; Coleman and 
Sim, 2000).  A similar example can be found in many Australian cities, where business interests have had input ranging 
‘from simply offering in principle support through to full responsibility for funding ongoing operations’ (Wilson and 
Sutton, 2003, p.3).  In a current example, the Japanese police authority reportedly intends to install security cameras in 
residential areas in 14 prefectures, and to ‘entrust volunteer groups of residents to operate and manage the equipment 
and image data’ (Japan Times, 2009). 
Those monitoring or reviewing CCTV footage ‘face a daunting task’, in that they must make judgements based on 
limited information (e.g. there is no sound), and in an unnatural context, in which the act of surveillance itself may 
generate an expectation of guilt (Williams, 2007, p. 100).  Michael and Michael (2009, p. 5) argue that the combination 
of implied guilt and absence of trust can lead to a society in which behaviour is performative, determined by ‘what we 
think we “must” do’.  There are also several authors who argue that the expectation of guilt is particularly directed 
towards marginal groups, and that CCTV is part of a ‘process by which economically powerful groups in society gain 
power through the private management of public space’ (Fussey, 2004, p. 231; White and Sutton, 1995). 
This brief discussion reveals a range of concerns and opinions regarding CCTV.  We identify a gap in this literature 
concerning the data implications of CCTV, in that we believe that discussion of the utility of CCTV in law enforcement 
remains incomplete without a full understanding of the various dimensions of the data and monetary costs of CCTV 
use.  We therefore move to that discussion now. 
TECHNOLOGY IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS 
The collection of CCTV video has several impacts on information and communications technology (ICT).  These can 
be loosely categorised as relating to: volume (impact on network services and provision of sufficient storage capacity); 
integrity (storage and retrieval and preservation of chain of custody); and identification (cataloguing, marking, indexing 
and searching for data of interest).  
Collection of CCTV imagery is not useful in law enforcement unless it is captured and stored in an identifiable manner.  
The imagery must be of a sufficiently high quality that it can be reasonably expected to accurately and usefully reflect 
the actions and activities being recorded.  The volume of data that is generated by each camera is substantial and must 
be transferred, stored, marked and labelled, indexed, archived and made available for view or retrieval.  The common 
multi-camera CCTV environment compounds this data transfer and management issue into the kind of problem 
normally only seen in specialised data processing environments such as video pre-production.  For this reason, CCTV 
                                                          
7 For example, the Mayor of Melbourne City Council stated that installing 31 new cameras (to a total of 54) has cost 
$AU1.8 million, and maintenance will cost $AU1 million annually (Johnston, 2009). 
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data can easily overload an unprepared network in interesting and unexpected ways (as we will explain below) and will 
quickly overwhelm all but the largest of data storage environments resulting in substantial cost impact. 
The expected and supported use of CCTV within an organisation will modify the degree to which CCTV will impact 
the ICT environment.  Decisions such as whether live-feed CCTV footage must be provided to a centralised monitoring 
facility are critical factors.  Optional storage, playback and archive of this data present additional problems.  In technical 
terms, CCTV footage is characterised as large-packet, high-volume, continuous, time-critical, and order-sensitive.  Each 
of these characteristics is important, and in combination they present a uniquely challenging data stream.  The high 
volume of data has some immediately obvious impacts on the underlying network and storage infrastructure.  The 
continuous delivery of large packets also has impacts on both the network and storage infrastructure and on other 
(seemingly unrelated) applications and services.  In other words, communicating this volume of data can cause 
unexpected problems elsewhere in a system. 
Diverse scenarios for CCTV networks  
There are several levels of CCTV data communication and storage, with different ramifications for networks and ICT 
resources and support.  We outline three simple CCTV streaming scenarios here as a guide for the reader, to help 
contextualise the following discussion on ICT implications.  In each case, we are talking specifically about public space 
systems, rather than monitoring of private premises.  The minimum and simplest case for CCTV use is simply the 
central collation of CCTV imagery for the purpose of (near) real-time monitoring.  This usage case has an impact on 
network services that, at a base level, is proportional to the number and quality of CCTV cameras in the environment.  
The lack of a long-term retrieval or review requirement simplifies the data storage needs and almost eliminates any 
need for a structured data labelling/marking/indexing and search facility.  This environment will experience a 
reasonably well understood network bandwidth impact.  The continuous transfer of CCTV data may also impact other 
services, such as IP telephony or video conferencing, in a manner that is less obvious.  
A somewhat more demanding case involves active monitoring with a medium-term retrieval requirement.  This case 
includes all of the attributes of the previous environment, but also adds a requirement to store CCTV data for longer 
periods of time.  This means that very large volumes of data storage must be provisioned, with a consequent increase in 
aspects such as: systems/hardware support and maintenance; systems and storage management overhead; data archiving 
and recovery facilities; physical and environmental factors (space, power, air-conditioning); and the network and 
licensing costs of maintaining these additional systems. 
A much more complex case involves active monitoring with a requirement for strict data integrity, chain of custody 
protection and search/playback facilities.  This environment provides the highest level of data integrity, capacity and 
capability for review of identified and surrounding footage.  This is the hardest and most expensive environment 
discussed.  This environment has the added challenges of requiring multiple and delayed playback facilities; 
comprehensive audit logging and data tracking capabilities; and an ability to guarantee data integrity.  
Timeliness 
It is generally expected that, for live-feed CCTV video to be useful in identifying current events, it will be available for 
display within 2 seconds of capture.  CCTV differs from some other video environments (such as video-conferencing) 
in that the imagery does not need to be transferred with high priority transfer queues to meet very tight time constraints 
(i.e. instantaneous transmission) and constant frame-refresh rates.  The requirement to have the imagery available 
within 2 seconds does, however, require that all captured data be transferred as it is collected, regardless of any other 
applications or services that the underlying network infrastructure may need to support. 
Data size  
CCTV system manufacturers regularly recommend video frame-rates of 5 to 15 frames (images) per second, and 
regularly provide ‘4CIF’ resolution (704x576 pixel) (see for example JSVG, 2009).  A single CCTV camera operating 
at the industry standard 4CIF resolution with H.264 encoding, capturing 10 images per second in a high-traffic public 
area can easily generate 864,000 frame each day, requiring 6.6 gigabytes (Gb) of data storage and 0.64 Mbps of 
dedicated network capacity.  The same location with a camera collecting digital-TV quality video can easily generate 
over 200Gb of data per day at a rate of 20 Mbps of constant network traffic for over 1.7 million individual frames.  
Additionally, an environment using older cameras or less efficient image encoding protocols will get lower quality 
images with higher data sizes.  
The nature of CCTV streaming drives a number of aspects of the transfer of that data over a network infrastructure.  
Streaming video data manifests as continuous, regular pulses of small groups of large data-packets.  This makes it quite 
different from the majority of traffic that modern data networks are expected to support.  The underlying infrastructure 
and protocols that go together to create a modern data network are designed to ensure the reliable delivery of data 
(packets) from one system to another.  They are designed with the expectation that the arriving data will be reasonably 
well distributed and fairly random in packet size and frequency.  Very few applications have any firm performance 
requirement, and those few usually have low individual time-on-delivery data volumes (for instance IP telephony, user 
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authentication, time synchronisation) or have burst-idle traffic flows (database replication, thin-client terminal services).  
Live streaming of CCTV, however, is both time-critical and high volume and this translates into extremely high 
pressure on networks. 
Horizontal impact 
In real terms, as each frame is transmitted (5-20 times per second) the data associated with that frame will be 
transmitted in a single pulse (burst), each of which will be at least 64kilobits (8kilobytes).  This will generate a burst of 
4 to 8 maximum size packets in a short continuous stream.  This will repeat 5 to 20 times each second.  When this 
traffic exists solely within a single LAN8, the impact will be minimal.  Where this traffic has to traverse lower-speed 
networks (such as WAN, Microwave, Satellite or Internet networks) or networks already experiencing some congestion, 
this pattern of time-critical traffic can have a substantial impact on such resources as WAN/router performance, 
reliability and quality of IP telephony, backup time, capacity planning, and network management.  The impact of these 
large data packets is further multiplied over legacy or long-distance network connections.  
Constant Traffic 
An often unexpected impact of real-time streaming video such as CCTV over modern networks is that this workload 
can cause much greater congestion in small to mid-range network equipment than would normally be expected.  
Modern networks and protocols are designed to handle relatively random traffic arriving as short, medium- to high-
volume bursts, followed by a period of calm.  The semi-continuous stream of large data packets that typifies the 
collection and capture of near-real-time CCTV footage acts to generate a constantly repeating interruption to the 
‘normal’ flow of network operations.  The larger and more capable network equipment is designed and built with 
sufficient local buffering capacity to smooth this localised congestion, and still provide most efficient functioning.  Less 
capable equipment will however suffer local inconsistencies of packet-delay and port congestion that can have a visible 
impact on the display of real-time streaming video, and a disproportionate impact on time-on-delivery services such as 
IP telephony.  Unlike many streaming video applications, it is not feasible to pre-load live-stream CCTV video. 
Data Volume 
The storage capacity required to support this volume of data for even a small installation is staggering.  As discussed 
above, a single medium-resolution camera can generate over 6Gb of video per day, 200Gb/month or 2.4Tb per year.  
An environment such as a small university campus, technology complex or passenger terminal may easily have over 
200 cameras.  These cameras alone would generate over 128 megabits/second of traffic (enough to fill over 80 home 
ADSL connections) and need more than 1,300Gb of storage each day.  Providing the capacity to store 28 days of this 
data will require close to 40Tb of disk and/or tape.  While the physical dimensions of this storage are roughly equivalent 
to a bar fridge, it would draw about 4 kilowatts of power9, and would need to be maintained in an air-conditioned and 
environmentally controlled room (with a set-up cost of $50,000-100,000, and commercial rental costs for the space of 
around $3-4,000 per annum). 
Network infrastructure faces similar challenges due to both the volume and nature of the traffic.  On initial inspection, 
0.64 Megabits/second does not appear difficult to modern network professionals who implement networks based on 100 
or 1000 Megabit connections for local and/or campus networks.  Using the example above, however, the deployment of 
just 200 cameras requires either the deployment of multiple dedicated 100 Megabit services, or upgrading core 
networking infrastructure to support 1,000 Megabit solely to service the CCTV management facility.  
Data Storage 
When contemplating the provision of capacity for storage of CCTV footage, a number of decisions need to be made 
with respect to how and when the footage will be used, and for how long the footage will be available.  Due to the data 
volume already outlined, many organisations have a hierarchical scheme for maintaining their CCTV footage.  For 
instance, they may by default, keep all cameras for 24 hours, 25% (of-interest cameras) for 48 hours, and 5%  
(entry/exit cameras) for 7 days.  Using the figures described above for 200 standard resolution cameras, this would 
require: 1.3Tb for the day, 320Gb for of-interest, 330Gb for entry/exit – or about 2Tb purely to support storage of 
transient CCTV data.  
There are several important points to note about this environment.  First, it does not provide for storage of ANY video 
footage beyond seven days, thus any archival or ad-hoc storage, labelling, marking or indexing of footage would have 
to be managed both separately from this system and within those time-frames.  Second, this example uses a fairly low 
resolution environment, such as one that is designed primarily for security guard use, rather than being of use for law 
enforcement or investigation.  Finally, as a point of comparison, 2Tb of storage would constitute a substantial portion of 
the full corporate data storage resources of many commercial and government environments. 
                                                          
8 Local Area Network – specifically in this case, a high-speed switched network (100Megabits/second or faster). 
9 An energy efficient office building uses 0.90watts/ft2 (9.7watts/m2), thus 4kw would light over 4000m2 of commercial 
office space (California Energy Commission 2008, p.2). 
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Design, operation and audit problems 
The factors outlined above add a layer of complexity in the design, implementation, day-to-day operation of a data 
environment, as well as in the review and audit processes.  This complexity will vary according to the organisation’s 
policies and legislative requirements.  These aspects are beyond the scope of the current paper, but warrant further 
exploration.  
LAW ENFORCEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The data volume and impact outlined above constitutes significant implications for any organisation.  They are 
particularly relevant to police forces because CCTV is receiving increasing attention internationally as a point of 
synergy between emerging technologies, mounting financial constraints on public institutions, and growing demands for 
visible policing in increasingly risk-averse societies.  Indeed, ‘the most common reason advanced for installing CCTV 
in town centres has been to combat loosely defined “anti-social behaviour”’ (Wilson and Sutton 2003, p. 2). 
Our concern is that installation of these systems places unrealistic expectations on police in terms of ability to resolve 
crime accurately, as well as unsustainable resource needs that will have significant impacts on other areas of police 
capacity unless expertly managed.  The most recent CCTV systems serve their intended purpose very well when 
installed competently and professionally, with well-defined areas of use.  However most such systems are utilised for 
area surveillance – that is, to provide a general overview of a broad area rather than providing close, sharp images of a 
face.  This renders them close to useless for prosecution in many cases. 
The fidelity required for CCTV to be effective in investigation and prosecution has extreme implications for networks 
and storage.  Compounding this, the vast majority are installed by salespeople rather than network specialists, and/or are 
installed according to budget needs rather than outcome needs, and thus they do not effectively monitor what people 
think they can monitor.  The importance of skilled professional installation of CCTV monitoring systems is critical to 
deploying a system that can satisfy the implementation objectives without severely impacting on other resources.  
Critically, these systems cannot be retrofitted to an existing environment, because the technology needs are vastly 
different. 
CONCLUSION 
An important question arising from this study is where this information leaves decision-makers within police forces and 
other organisations.  In terms of what is available in the present moment, this information reveals that it is possible to 
have a very effective monitoring system that is targeted to carefully identified and clearly specified needs.  Where this 
is matched by an appropriately designed system that is professionally installed and fully covered by budget, it will not 
disrupt other services and may be an effective supplement to other policing measures.  Considering these factors 
carefully before committing to a CCTV system (or any other policing approach) will help to ensure appropriate 
expectations and operational effectiveness.  
In terms of what is desirable, this points to a need to explore ways to a) reduce the raw data network overhead (for 
instance through improved data compression techniques that don’t adversely affect visual acuity); b) enhance the stored 
data as and when required; and c) improve the point-effectiveness of CCTV through features such as facial recognition 
technology or facial feature recording.  Development is progressing in all of these areas, as is the skill of professional 
CCTV designers and installation professionals.  This means that with time and ongoing technological improvements, 
CCTV will become an increasingly useful tool in policing.  To ensure that this becomes reality, it will be important to 
have clear communication from police regarding their needs and desires with respect to such systems. 
There is not good evidence that CCTV is any more useful in crime prevention than any other ambient factor.  For this 
reason, costs and technological impacts must be carefully considered, and we have shown that these are significant – 
and certainly not cost-savers for politically and financially pressured law enforcement agencies.  Set-up and 
maintenance costs are further increased when monitoring, data transfer and storage costs are added.  For victims of 
crime, such costs may appear entirely justified if they help to secure convictions, and where clear CCTV images exist, 
investigators and prosecutors will find their tasks more streamlined and efficient. 
In contrast, low image quality, conflicting goals of camera systems (e.g. area surveillance vs. face identification), and 
inadequate ICT systems can severely undermine the utility of CCTV in crime prevention.  In this sense, CCTV systems 
must be carefully planned: systems aimed at deterrence or perhaps rapid response to incidents at events such as sporting 
matches require significantly less storage capacity, lower image quality and thus less streaming capacity.  It should not 
be expected, however, that such a system would be equally effective for prosecution.  On this basis, it is important to 
fully understand technological implications as well as effectiveness of CCTV before systems are designed, costed and 
implemented. 
CCTV is not a golden bullet: it requires significant financial, technological, storage and systems input to work 
effectively – and even then, challenges remain such as the social impacts on marginalised groups.  We conclude that 
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police (and their governments) would be well advised seriously to consider alternative means of meeting identified 
needs before turning to CCTV.  The kind of investment needed for CCTV that fulfils the fourfold law enforcement 
purpose (deterrence, rapid response, investigation and identification, and prosecution of crime) is certainly not a cost- or 
resource-saving exercise.  Video-based surveillance systems are surprisingly resource-intense, expensive and task-
specific. 
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